Paid to care for Mum: what Rogers v Wills means for family carers

Can a daughter be paid for looking after her mother, when nobody ever agreed a price? Yes, said the High Court in Rogers v Wills. Bern Rogers cared for her mother, Sheila, at her home in Bristol for two and a half years. Sheila insisted her daughter be paid properly, but no figure was ever fixed [38]. After Sheila died the family split apart over it. Three judgments later, Bern was awarded £127,500, plus interest from her mother's estate [Q61].

The case matters to any family where one person does the caring. Its central point is simple. A promise to pay a relative for care can be a binding contract, even if it was never written down and nobody named a price.

1. The facts, in three cases

The family

Sheila Wills was born in August 1927 [Q5]. She and her husband John had nine children. Six survived them both [3]. John died in December 2012, and Sheila lived on alone in the family home in Southrepps, north-east of Norwich [27]. Her will of December 2015 named her son Andrew as executor and left her estate equally between her surviving children [4].

The judge noted how close the family had been. Reading years of their messages, he said Theirs is a big, happy family, in which there are no secrets, only joys to be shared [24].

How Sheila came to live in Bristol

By her 90th birthday in August 2017, Sheila was lonely and forgetful [28]. On 10 September 2017 neighbours found her wandering in the road, confused, asking after her late husband [31]. Three days later she went to stay with her eldest daughter, Bern, in Bristol. It was meant as a stop-gap [32]. Bern had worked as an auxiliary nurse and started nurse training, but left it to raise her family [Q31]. Her husband Jon is a retired GP [32].

At first Sheila's other daughter, Maryanne, suggested £50 a week. Bern took four payments, then gave the £200 back. It did not cover the real cost, and she did not want her mother to run short of cash [33].

In late October 2017 Bern took Sheila home to Southrepps. Bern had arranged to meet a home care agency, hoping carers could come in so Sheila could stay in her own house. Sheila refused. She did not want live-in carers, and asked to go back to Bristol with Bern [37]. Before they left, the judge found:

Sheila insisted to the claimant that her return to Bristol would be on terms that she "wanted to pay her way", and the claimant would be "paid properly" for looking after her. The claimant agreed that she would be. There was no discussion as to the amount that would be paid. That was left over for the future. [38]

They returned to Bristol on 2 November 2017. Soon after, Sheila told Jon: I don't want charity. You must make sure that [the claimant] is paid for looking after me [38].

Two and a half years of care

In February 2018 Sheila signed two lasting powers of attorney, one for property and financial affairs and one for health and welfare. Both appointed Bern and Andrew jointly [44]. In September 2018 her GP formally diagnosed vascular dementia [68]. Her health got steadily worse. She developed a painful rectal prolapse, double incontinence, glaucoma and skin cancers [60] [69] [80] [91].

Her care came to mean being watched day and night. Bern and Jon could not both leave the house. Their only regular break was an hour and a half on Tuesday evenings, when a volunteer sat with Sheila [Q33] [Q34]. Bern gave up paid childcare for her grandchildren [36].

Payment came up again and again, but never with a figure. In January 2018 Andrew wrote that Bern also need[ed] to be compensated for mum living with you [42]. In August 2019 he wrote: We (you and me) really need to sort out Mum's method of financing her care for the time she is with you. Bern replied that she was putting together an invoice [85]. Nothing was settled.

"Just take it"

On 2 April 2020, during the first Covid lockdown, Sheila fell on the stairs and broke several ribs [105]. She did not recover. On 18 April Bern told Andrew by phone that she still had not taken any money for her mother's care. The judge found that Andrew replied Just take it, or words to that effect. He also found that Andrew honestly no longer remembered saying it [113] [122].

Sheila died at Bern's home on 19 April 2020 [124] [126]. Over the next month Bern moved £100,000 from her mother's accounts to her own [129]. Her siblings did not know. Andrew later wrote to her that their powers as attorneys had lapsed with her death [139]. An LPA ends automatically when the donor dies. On 2 June 2020 she sent the family an invoice: 900 days of care at £150 a day, £135,000 in all [140].

Andrew accused her of fraud and demanded the money back within 24 hours [144]. The bank later took the money back and recredited Sheila's accounts [155]. Bern was prosecuted for theft. In October 2022 a jury at Bristol Crown Court found her not guilty [161]. In May 2023 she sued Andrew, as executor, for the value of her care [7].

Case one: the liability trial

The first trial decided only whether the estate owed Bern anything at all. It was heard by HHJ Paul Matthews in February 2025. The case had been transferred to the County Court, probably because it was of modest value and looked simple. The judge moved it back to the High Court because it raised a number of difficult legal questions [8].

Bern's main claim was that Sheila had made a contract to pay her. Her backup claim was in "unjust enrichment": that the estate had received valuable care and it would be unjust not to pay for it [5]. Andrew's case was that the family only ever agreed Bern should not be out of pocket. He denied any agreement to pay commercial-style rates [20].

On 6 June 2025 the judge found for Bern on both claims. Sheila had made a contract to pay a reasonable price for her care. If that was wrong, the estate was liable in unjust enrichment anyway [248]. He urged the family to settle the amount through mediation, saying the case cries out for mediation rather than litigation [248].

Case two: the costs ruling

Andrew asked the court to wait until the amount was decided before ruling on who paid the legal costs. The judge refused. Whatever the reasonable price turned out to be, it will not be nothing, or purely nominal [C17]. On 7 July 2025 he ordered Andrew to pay Bern's costs of the liability trial, with £75,685.50 to be paid on account [C21].

He added a point every executor should know. Those costs are Andrew's personal liability. Whether he can recover them from the estate is a separate question [C22] [C23].

Case three: the trial on how much

The parties could not reach a mediated settlement [Q20]. District Judge Wales heard the trial on the amount in June 2026. Bern still claimed £150 a day for 900 days, £135,000 [Q6]. Andrew said Sheila needed only two to three hours of help a day, valued at council care-worker rates less 20% for tax. That came to £17,195.88 [Q7].

On 25 August 2026 the judge accepted Bern's daily rate in full. He cut the period to 850 days, because the contract was made around 2 November 2017, not when Sheila first arrived in September [Q30]. That gave £127,500, plus interest [Q61].

3. The law

The judge began with a warning. The court decides legal rights, not who behaved better. The moral position of any of the parties or their siblings is simply irrelevant [2].

Did Sheila have capacity to make a contract?

Capacity to make a contract is governed by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 [168]. Three rules mattered here:

• The presumption. Under section 1(2), a person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is shown that they lack it.
• The test. Under sections 2(1) and 3(1), a person lacks capacity if they cannot make the decision because of an impairment of the mind or brain. That means being unable to understand, retain, use or weigh the relevant information, or to communicate the decision.
• No shortcuts. Under section 2(3), lack of capacity cannot be established merely by a person's condition. A diagnosis of dementia is not enough on its own.

Capacity is both person- and decision-specific, and it can change from day to day [169] [170]. The judge also dealt with an argument Andrew had made in his emails: that Sheila needed an LPA because she lacked capacity [139]. That gets it backwards. A donor must have capacity to make a valid LPA. Having one is not even evidence of, let alone proves, a lack of capacity [172].

Can you have a contract with no price?

Yes, as long as there is a binding agreement in the first place. Once there is, leaving the price out does not necessarily defeat it. Despite the apparent vagueness, a contract for a "reasonable" price is a perfectly good contract [173]. The judge relied on Way v Latilla (1937), where the House of Lords awarded reasonable pay for work that was plainly not meant to be free [173].

Statute says the same. Section 15 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 covers contracts for a service that do not fix the price. It implies a term that the customer will pay a reasonable charge. What is reasonable is a question of fact [175].

Can a promise within a family be binding?

A contract needs an intention to create legal relations. Many people assume promises between relatives never count. The judge said plainly that this is a mistake:

It is sometimes thought that, where an arrangement is entered into between members of a family, even close members, then as a matter of fact there is no intention to create legal relations. This is wrong. It is always a question on the evidence available (and the relationship is only one element in this) as to whether there is an intention to create legal relations. [177]

The famous case on this is Balfour v Balfour (1919). A wife could not enforce her husband's promise of a monthly allowance, because the court found it was a domestic arrangement, never meant to be enforced in law [178] [179]. But Balfour does not say family promises can never bind. The question is always what the parties intended [181]. Families make legally binding arrangements all the time: gifts, jobs in the family business, tenancies and loans [182].

Intention is judged objectively. What counts is what Sheila's words and conduct would have conveyed to a reasonable person in Bern's position, not what Sheila privately thought [242].

The fallback: unjust enrichment

If there is no contract, a claim can sometimes be brought in unjust enrichment. The court asks four questions. Was the defendant enriched? Was it at the claimant's expense? Was the enrichment unjust? Is there a defence [186]?

For the third question, the claimant has to point to a recognised reason why the enrichment was unjust. Two were argued here [189]:

• Failure of basis. A benefit was given on a shared understanding that it was conditional, and the condition was not met [204].
• Free acceptance. The recipient knew, or should have known, the services were expected to be paid for, and did not turn them down when they had a reasonable chance to [233].

Free acceptance is controversial among academics, and a deputy High Court judge had recently rejected it [225] [233]. HHJ Matthews disagreed with him, and held that free acceptance is part of English law:

a reasonable person who benefits from services rendered who should have known that the services were expected to be paid for but, having a reasonable opportunity to do so, did not reject them cannot deny having been unjustly enriched. [235]

4. Applying the law to the facts

Sheila had capacity in October 2017

Sheila had made a professionally drawn will in 2015 and signed LPAs in 2018. Doctors kept discussing her own health with her. She made her own decisions about what she bought [239]. Her later dementia diagnosis did not mean she lacked capacity earlier, and section 2(3) forbade treating the condition as proof. The judge was very far from satisfied that she had lost capacity by October 2017 [239]. Even Andrew accepted under cross-examination that she then had capacity to make a contract [38].

The family promise was binding

This is the heart of the case. Sheila was not making a vague, kindly remark. She did not want charity, and she insisted to Bern, Jon and their children that Bern must be paid "properly" [240]. The judge compared the arrangement with paying a care home or hiring carers. Nobody would doubt that was a contract. He saw no sufficient reason not to take the same view if the arrangement was with the claimant rather than a third party [240]. Then the key passage:

This was not a short-term family or social treat by one family member to another. It was an important long-term living arrangement, involving hard work and unsocial hours, and impacting considerably on the contractor's existing lifestyle, including preventing her from earning money in other ways. [240]

So all the elements of a contract were present. Sheila and Bern agreed what was to be done. No price was fixed, but it was plainly a contract for services at a reasonable price [241]. Because the price was never fixed, the 1982 Act implied a duty to pay a reasonable sum [176]. And even if Sheila had privately meant something else, the objective test meant she would be held to what her words conveyed [242].

Andrew's own messages and letters helped Bern. He had written that she needed to be compensated [42]. After Sheila's death he wrote You are due payment for Mum's care and this has never been disputed [139].

Unjust enrichment would have succeeded too

In case he was wrong about the contract, the judge held Bern would still win. Sheila received substantial care, at Bern's expense. She accepted it, knowing it was expected to be paid for, when she could have declined it. That was free acceptance, and there was no defence [244].

Bern's own lawyers had argued failure of basis instead. The judge said that argument proves too much. If Sheila had shared the understanding that the care was to be paid for, that is simply a contract [247].

Valuing the care

Andrew's case on the amount rested largely on one message from April 2018. In it Bern suggested Sheila could manage at home with someone coming in for a couple of hours a day. Bern explained she had put it that way so as not to frighten her mother. The judge accepted that, calling the idea hopelessly over-optimistic [Q43].

He found the nearest commercial comparison was a live-in carer, on hand day and night [Q45]. Three points shaped the award:

• The rules for personal injury claims did not apply. Those cases value care a relative gives for free, and usually discount for tax. This was a debt under a contract, and the sum is likely to be taxable in Bern's hands. So there was no 20% tax discount [Q11] [Q12].
• Market cost was the starting point. In a contract claim, the starting point is likely to be what the same or a similar service would cost in the market [Q17].
• Bern's figure was below the market. The evidence put 24-hour care from a home care agency at about £218,450 over the 850 days. It put managed live-in care at about £130,900, before extra charges and board and lodging [Q46] [Q48]. Bern's £150 a day included food, a room and travel.

The judge concluded that This was not a case of occasional assistance between family members, nor one of limited domestic support [Q58]. £150 a day falls comfortably within the range of reasonable remuneration [Q60].

5. What families can learn

The judge called the case a real tragedy. He also said it was a two-way street. Bern could have told her siblings what Andrew had said, or told him how much she meant to take, before taking anything. Both would have been sensible things to do, though neither of them was legally necessary [123]. Three things stand out:

• Agree a figure, and write it down. Sheila's wish to pay was clear to everyone around her. The amount never was. A clear written agreement, made while Sheila could make the decision, could have reduced the risk of this dispute.
• Remember that an LPA ends at death. It ends automatically. After that, the executors or other personal representatives deal with the estate, not the attorneys. Bern took the £100,000 after her mother had died [129]. And while the donor is alive, an attorney who is also a paid carer has a conflict of interest. The Office of the Public Guardian's guidance says they need the Court of Protection's approval.
• Keep evidence of capacity. Here the legal presumption was enough. In a closer case, a record made at the time can show the person understood what they were agreeing to. That is what a Capacity Snapshot is for.

If you want a relative to be paid for caring for you, agree it and record it while you have capacity. If you want an attorney to charge for acting under your LPA, put payment instructions in the LPA itself. Our guide to paying your attorneys and carers explains the options. Our LPAs let you record your wishes, with a solicitor checking everything before you sign.

Start your LPA

This article is for general information and is not legal advice. If you are caring for a relative, or are worried about a claim against an estate, please get in touch for advice on your own situation.

Sources

• Rogers v Wills [2025] EWHC 1367 (Ch) on Find Case Law. The liability judgment, 6 June 2025. Plain paragraph numbers.
• Rogers v Wills [2025] EWHC 1367 (Ch) on BAILII
• Rogers v Wills [2025] EWHC 1711 (Ch) on Find Case Law. The costs judgment, 7 July 2025. Paragraph numbers marked "C".
• Rogers v Wills [2025] EWHC 1711 (Ch) on BAILII
• Rogers v Wills [2026] EWHC 2231 (Ch) on Find Case Law. The quantum judgment, 25 August 2026. Paragraph numbers marked "Q".
• Rogers v Wills [2026] EWHC 2231 (Ch) on BAILII
• Rogers v Wills [2025] EWHC 1524 (Ch) on Find Case Law. The ruling on the draft judgment embargo, 20 June 2025.
• Mental Capacity Act 2005, section 1 on legislation.gov.uk
• Mental Capacity Act 2005, section 2 on legislation.gov.uk
• Mental Capacity Act 2005, section 3 on legislation.gov.uk
• Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, section 12 on legislation.gov.uk
• Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, section 15 on legislation.gov.uk
• OPG's approach to family care payments (SD14) on GOV.UK. Updated 22 September 2026.
• When a lasting power of attorney ends on GOV.UK
• 89 Holland Park (Management) Ltd v Dell [2026] EWHC 1624 (Ch) on Find Case Law. Cites the liability judgment as [2025] 1 WLR 4995, at [66].